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Introduction
In recent years, the European Union (EU) has acquired enforcement competences in areas where it previously only had regulatory authority. The latest example concerns the European Central Bank (ECB). As of November 2014, it is exclusively competent (Article 4, Regulation 1024/2013) to supervise significant credit institutions, which includes making on-site inspections and imposing fines for non-compliance (Scholten and Ottow, 2014) . The expansion of EU enforcement competences is in contrast to the traditional division of competences between the EU and its member states (MS), where regulation was part of the EU's competences and enforcement of EU law was left to MS.
According to some, the step towards enforcement followed the need for a closer monitoring of compliance of individuals, companies and national governments with EU regulations, investigating suspicious cases and punishing for non-compliance with EU law as national governments failed, or were simply unwilling, to do so (de Moor-van Vugt and Widdershoven, 2015) .
The addition of enforcement next to regulatory competences can be interpreted as a new type of functional spillover. Functional spillover is commonly associated with MS cooperation including new economic sectors or policy areas in order to attain the goals in another, i.e. a broadening, or an increase in competences of the supra-national body in a policy area, i.e. a deepening (Lelieveldt and Princen, 2015; Cini and Perez-Solorzano Borragan, 2013; George and Bache, 2001) . The notion that competences at one stage in the policy cycle may necessitate the creation of capacity in another stage in order to ensure adequate policy implementation is novel. Neither classic nor recent works on functional spillover treat this concept as a unique type of functional spillover (Haas, 1958 (Haas, , 1961 Lindberg, 1963; Sandholtz and Stone Sweet, 2010; Niemann, 1998) ; where enforcement competences are mentioned, discussion is about more competences, not the type. No distinction is made between giving capacities within one policy cycle stage (regulation) leading to the addition of competences in another stage (enforcement). We may hence consider the furthering of competences along the stages of the policy cycle as different from the more established broadening of policy areas and deepening of regulatory competences. This paper investigates the nature of this 'policy cycle type of functional spillover' and addresses the question of in how far we are witnessing a new type of functional spillover. It debates the novelty of the concept and the question of whether or not the development is indeed a new type of functional spillover.
1 This revisiting of the concept of functional spillover has the academic value that a more precise classification can imply new insights and that criteria regarding what constitutes a spillover effect are sharpened. On a practical note, we believe that especially in times of increasing Euroscepticism in which 'less Europe' is a popular political credo the increasing enforcement competences stand in stark contrast to popular sentiments. As such, it represents an interesting case for the spillover concept.
We proceed as follows. First, we dive deeper into the concept of functional spillover and investigate a) the novelty of the concept -is there a lack of attention to a policy cycle type within functional spillover? -and b) the possible criteria to assess when a development can be considered a spillover effect. We continue by presenting the expansion of the EU's competence in direct enforcement at the hand of the empowering of EU institutions and agencies with direct enforcement powers vis-à-vis private parties (not vis-à-vis MS as has been traditionally the case), regulation of national direct enforcement by EU law and the proliferation of enforcement networks of national supervisors at the EU level. Then, we investigate whether the proliferation of European Enforcement Authorities (EEAs), the most far-reaching of the three developments in terms of allocation of direct enforcement 1 We explicitly do not wish to enter the debate of neofunctionalism vs intergouvernmentalism here. We merely believe to have come across a potentially new type of functional spillover that we wish to convey to the academic community.
powers at the EU level, is due to functional necessity or specific developments. Are we dealing with a new type of functional spillover? The subsequent section reflects upon the broader conceptual implications of our finding. In conclusion, we indicate further research directions.
Spillover: the original meaning
The concept of spillover is the most prominent aspect of neofunctionalism. It represents the core dynamic of the theory to understand the European integration process. In general, spillover refers to "a situation in which a given action, related to a specific goal, creates a situation in which the original goal can be assured only by taking further actions, which in turn create a further condition and a need for more action, and so forth" (Lindberg, 1963, p. 10) . In terms of EU integration, spillover describes the process whereby members of an integration scheme, who initially transferred competences to a supranational body in order to attain a common goal in a certain sector, realize that this goal can only be attained by extending supranational competences, either through expanding collaboration into related sectors or by intensifying commitment in the original sector Strøby Jensen, 2003; Schmitter, 1969) . The challenges that necessitate further integration are often unintended outcomes of past agreements between the members of the integration scheme, creating the setting for a potentially continuous process towards full integration.
Generally, three types of spillover are distinguished: functional, political and cultivated (Lelieveldt and Princen, 2015; Strøby Jensen, 2013; George and Bache, 2001) . 23 Functional spillover refers to 2 There three types follow closely the three mechanisms that Haas (1958) theorized would drive integration processes: positive spillover, the transfer of domestic allegiances and technocratic automaticity.
3 Some mention also a fourth type, i.e. induced spillover. It implies the development of common external positions in a regional bloc influenced by unexpected results of the integration, external pressures and inspired outsiders by the successes of the integration (Niemann, 1998) .
the notion that successful cooperation in one sector requires and creates pressures for cooperation, both technically as well as policy-wise, in functionally related sectors or an intensification of cooperation in the original sector (Strøby Jensen, 2013) . Further integration is a functional necessity to achieve earlier set goals. Political spillover "involves the build-up of political pressures [by national
interest groups] in favour of further integration within the states involved" (George and Bache, 2001 4 Within the functionalist notion of spillover, emphasis is largely on a broadening across policy areas, i.e. the 'expansive logic' that integration in one policy-area spills over into adjacent areas, and also on a deepening of cooperation within policy areas, i.e. gaining more competences in a policy area (Rosamond, 2000) . The classic example of broadening of competences is that the integration in economic sectors would promote integration in social policy areas. An illustration of the deepening within one sector would be a customs union built on an agreed exchange rate parity mechanism would increase incentives for wider monetary cooperation, such as a currency union. The notion that competences at one stage in the policy cycle may necessitate the creation of capacity in another in order to ensure adequate policy implementation is neither stated explicitly in the classic works on spillover (Haas 1958 (Haas , 1961 Lindberg, 1963) nor leading lecture books (Lelieveldt and Princen, 2015; Cini and Perez-Solorzano Borragan, 2013; George and Bache, 2001 ). This policy cycle type of functional spillover, i.e. the process of expansion of competences from one step in the policy cycle to another (such as between regulation and enforcement), simply does not feature there.
Some recent works on neofunctionalism (Niemann, 1998; Sandholtz and Stone Sweet, 2010) Figure 1 ). In the end, the positioning of competences and the focus on the amount instead of the type seems to indicate that we are stumbling upon a new type of functional spillover, that of a policy cycle type. credible commitments or subsequent constraints are an unintended consequence of delegation? Of these, the first point seems tailor-made for functional spillover. The second seems less relevant when assessing the presence of functional spillover. Who (MS, lobby groups or EU) drives the process or picks up on the need for further integration is beside the point of whether there is a necessity to further integrate to achieve earlier set policy goals. The point is clearly more attuned towards political and/or cultivated spillover and the broader neofunctionalist vs intergouvernmentalist debate; we hence leave it out of our assessment. 6 The final point, in our opinion, is already captured in the first and seems superfluous by definition. As such, we propose to investigate the following:
-Does the shift from regulation to enforcement in the EU policy cycle occur due to exogenous pressures or pressures originating from previous integration bargains, i.e. from specific events like crisis or from functional necessity?
In this sense, when we find that the expansion of the EU's competence in direct enforcement of EU law follows the already given regulatory (norm setting) competence to the EU for the reason that the achievement of the set policy goals necessitates the expansion, we consider this as proof to the policy cycle type of functional spillover. If, however, it is not functional necessity but specific developments that launched the expansion of enforcement competence, then it is not.
jointly, but substantial decisions are still taken autonomously at national level -all policy decisions taken by joint community processes. The investigation occurs in two steps. First, we discuss three developments that demonstrate the expansion of the EU's competence in direct enforcement. Second, we investigate whether the proliferation of EEAs, the most far-reaching of the three developments in terms of allocation of direct enforcement powers at the EU level, is due to functional necessity or exogenous pressures.
We look at the year of establishment and presence of enforcement powers upon creation, the extension of EEA powers and the reasons for it given by the legislator, and the exogenous pressures mentioned by the legislator. We then debate for each of the EEAs, seven in total, in how far we can consider the increasing enforcement competences as examples of the policy cycle type of functional spillover. Afterwards, we reflect upon the significance of and implications following from our finding.
The expansion of the EU's enforcement competence
Traditionally, the division of competences between the EU and national levels has been "designed to follow the logic of a system of executive federalism" (Tűrk, 2009, p. 218 ). In such a system, general and abstract rules would be adopted at the EU level, while the implementation and application of those rules would be the responsibility of the Member States. Once a rule is passed at the EU level, the Member States have to transpose it into the national level, including passing relevant national legislation where relevant, and to enforce it. Direct enforcement of EU rules implies monitoring compliance with law by companies and individuals (e.g. checking relevant reports from the industry), investigating suspicious cases (e.g. inspecting business premises), and punishing for non-compliance with EU law (e.g. imposing fines) (Rowe, 2009; Vervaele, 1999a; Duk, 1999) . This is in contrast to indirect enforcement, where the Commission monitors national authorities on how they enforce EU law vis-à-vis private bodies. This traditional division between EU norm setting and national direct enforcement has changed drastically.
Three developments show that the EU's competence in direct enforcement of EU law has expanded. installations; they may take samples of wine products and make copies of certain documents. "The most extensive Community influence is to be found in the olive oil and tobacco sectors" (Jans et al., 2007) . Relevant EU legislation has required setting up specialized enforcement agencies, whose duties and organization are determined by the EU who also partly finances their operation. Overall, 7 This is a result of the scan of all EU policy areas and actors, which has been conducted for an ongoing project of Renforce 'verticalisation of enforcement in the EU'
(«http://renforce.rebo.uu.nl/en/bouwsteenprojecten/verticalisering-en-toezichthouders/»). many regulations and some directives regulate national enforcement activities (Jans et al., 2007) .
Further (quantitative) research is essential to establish the exact scope of the EU's 'regulatory enforcement'. The qualitative expansion is clearly seen in the development of prescribing the type of sanctions for national enforcement authorities by the EU legislator, which has gone from reparatory to administrative punitive and since recently also to criminal sanctions (Vervaele, 2007; Jans et al. 2007 ).
Third, there is a considerable growth of enforcement networks via which the EU can influence national enforcement and cooperation in cross-border cases. (Kaeding and Versluis, 2014) .
While networks do not have direct enforcement powers on their own, their importance can be threefold. First, they can enhance cooperation between national authorities and promote enforcement of EU law in cross-border cases. Second, the Commission, being part of these networks, can influence national enforcement through coordination, informal pressure and data, which they receive from the member states and on their own initiative. Third, informal networks could be seen as an initial step towards more centralized and powerful structures like EU agencies (the case of ESMA).
Proliferation of EEAs -functional spillover?
Having established the novelty of the concept and delineated the expansion of the EU's competence in direct enforcement, we now turn to determining whether the trend constitutes a new type of functional spillover, what we called the policy cycle type. We investigate the most far-reaching of the earlier discussed developments -the proliferation of EEAs -by addressing the question whether the expansion of the EU's direct enforcement competence occurred due to functional necessity (pressures originating from previous integration bargains) or specific developments (exogenous pressures).
9
To determine the origin of the initial impetus, we check the year of creation of EEAs and whether enforcement powers were given to EEAs from the outset or not (column 2). Furthermore, we investigate when and how enforcement powers of EEAs were expanded (column 3) and the reasons given by the legislator for this expansion (column 4). Finally, we also investigate the exogenous pressures mentioned by the legislator for this expansion (column 5). In this sense, if the legislator references 'past regulatory imperfections', and not specific events, as the reason for increasing enforcement competences, it indicates a 'spillover' from the regulation to enforcement
stage. 10 Table 1 shows an overview of the studied legislation and literature. 9 We have considered the initial impetus behind the establishment of enforcement power at the EU level as the decisive criterion in section 2. If the functional necessity stemmed from the existing regulatory integration and is not launched due to exogenous pressures like crisis, we see this as an indication of functional spillover. 10 An EEA (or its predecessor) without original enforcement powers indicates a policy cycle type of functional spillover if it receives such powers later in order to overcome 'past regulatory imperfections'. In cases where an EEA (or its predecessor) did exist with weak enforcement powers but expanded them after the crisis, we consider the crisis (exogenous pressures) as an accelerating factor and the case as the policy type of functional spillover because the crisis did not launch centralization enforcement. In the cases where enforcement competences did not exist before and appeared after a crisis, no functional spillover takes place. Analyzing the data gathered in Table 1 , we can roughly distinguish three categories of EEAs related to the spillover question.
First, OLAF, EMA and EFCA clearly indicate the (functional) spillover effect. Regulatory integration in these sectors, including harmonization of national rules, preceded the establishment of these EEAs (or their predecessors). The EU legislator has explicitly mentioned 'past imperfections' leading to reforms (see Table 1 , words underlined), which necessitated the 'spillover' to the enforcement stage. The legislator did not refer to any exogenous pressures while reasoning the expansion of enforcement powers.
Second, the Commission and EASA are the group where the policy cycle type of functional spillover did not happen due to past imperfections but in order to avoid possible imperfections in the future.
Created by the Treaty of Rome (1957) , the Commission received enforcement powers in the area of competition law almost immediately (1962) . The transfer was not based on 'past imperfections' (or specific events for that matter), rather on the anticipation of challenges to ensuring uniform application of EU law without a strong role of the Commission in enforcement (see Table 1 ).
Similarly, the creation of EASA with enforcement powers in 2002 has the 'forward looking' logic behind it. While the Pan European regulatory integration in the aviation sector was ongoing since the 1970s and the regulation of certain aspects existed in the form of harmonizing legislation, EASA with its enforcement competences comes from the existing regulatory integration at the time and the desire to establish and apply relevant rules in a uniform manner.
The third group is the most intriguing one since the 2008 financial crisis certainly played a crucial role in shaping the EU's current financial architecture. At the same time, the crisis did not start centralization of financial supervision. As the 2009 De Larosiere report stated, 'Supervisory reform has so far relied on an evolutionary approach <…>. While certain progress in convergence has been achieved, this progress has not allowed the EU to identify and/or deal with the causes of the current financial crisis." To promote internal market, the financial reforms started in 2000 with a report by the Committee of Wise Men (Lamfalussy Report). The report identified a 'common belief' that the European Union's regulatory framework was 'too slow, too rigid, complex and ill-adapted to the pace of global financial market change' and that at that time existing rules and regulations were 'implemented differently', which resulted in inconsistencies in the treatment of the same type of business (Final Report, 2001) . Following the report's recommendation, three committees (networks of national supervisors) were created to assist the implementation of EU rules at home. However, in contrast to the Lamfalussy Report's expectation that the outcome of the work of these committees would have authority, measures agreed in these committees were not applied consistently by national supervisors. Some national supervisors issued guidance diverging from guidance agreed at the EU level. The problem was two-fold. On the one hand, standards and guidelines adopted by networks of national supervisors were non-binding, which caused an inconsistent interpretation and application of the agreed standards at the national level. On the other hand, it was the absence of any binding power of the committee to tell a national supervisor that its interpretation of EU law was wrong. In addition, differences in administrative and criminal sanctions at the national level remained significant (Commission, 2010). Whether we would have as strong ECB and ESMA as we have today without the crisis is certainly a valid question. However, the policy cycle type of functional spillover can be witnessed in the fact that the financial reforms started before the crisis and led to the creation of networks dealing with, among other things, questions of improving uniform enforcement. Therefore, the spillover to the enforcement stage was on its way, even if it would not have led to the powerful ECB and ESMA of today without the boost from the crisis.
Overall, while at least in five out of seven cases functional needs are at the core of why enforcement competences of the EU have grown, no EEA was found to trace its roots solely to exogenous pressures. This leads us to conclude that we are indeed witnessing a new type of functional spillover. Also, compliance by companies was not characterized very positively (Versluis, 2007; Versluis, 2003) .
Non-compliance by MS can have different causes ranging from complexity of EU law to the lack of resources and political willingness (the 'salience issue' (Versluis, 2007) ), especially if other countries (also) fail to comply or if compliance may affect economic competitiveness of a MS, which pushed for regulatory enforcement (Moor-van Vugt and Widdershoven, 2015) . The infringement procedure tool of the Commission has its limits, especially when MSs repeatedly violate EU law, even after successful actions brought by the Commission before the CJEU (Wenneras, 2006) . In addition, differences in enforcement laws as well as in powers, capacities, regimes and strategies among national supervisory authorities exist and may cause disparities and ineffectiveness of EU law and policies (Scholten and Ottow, 2014) .
Proliferation of EU networks and agencies has been explained by functional needs, political motives and social logics (Groenleer et al., 2010; Eberlein and Newman, 2008; Martens, 2006; Kelemen, 2002) . Enhancing coordination, cooperation, exchange of best practices and sometimes centralizing certain enforcement tasks via EU entities have been thought to address nonimplementation problems. Such structures represent a more acceptable solution for the MS to transfer some powers to the EU level and yet keep control over the powers. This is in contrast to letting the Commission gain more direct powers. Moreover, whereas enforcement jurisdiction of national authorities is bound by national borders, which could hinder cross-border investigations, the territorial competences of EU authorities can include joint territories of all the participating MS.
Depending on their specific institutional designs, these advantages gain even greater weight when time consuming schemes for mutual legal (administrative or criminal law) assistance are removed from their legal design (Luchtman and Vervaele, 2014) .
Discussion
The identified policy cycle type of functional spillover is significant in several respects: for the notion of functional spillover, for neofunctionalism as a theory of integration, and for the debate between neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism.
First, it brings awareness to the difference between the addition of competences in other policy cycle steps and a deepening of competences within a single policy cycle step. So far, the concept of functional spillover has been discussed only from the perspectives of broadening and deepening of competences, which do not necessarily include the 'furthering' type of expansion of competence (from regulation to enforcement). This nuance deserves its own attention as it gives new insights on the integration process. It also could, combined with the identified EU's growing competence in direct enforcement (via three developments), influence the debate between neofunctionalists and intergovermentalists, which so far has primarily focused on the 'rule-making' EU. Does the policy cycle type of functional spillover, for example, show that the integration process actually continues in times where we otherwise consider it at a halt? Second, the policy cycle logic provides a more concrete possibility for predicting next integration efforts. One of the major points of theoretical critique of neofunctionalist theory is the argument that "neofunctionalism sought to construct a comprehensive synthesis without a reliable set of theoretical elements, <…> to predict without a reliable explanation" (Moravscik 2005) . In other words, while spillover theory might predict ever more integration in the case of functional necessity (when), it cannot really state what, where and how. The policy cycle type of functional spillover, however, can to a certain extent. The three developments and the analysis of EEAs discussed earlier show that enforcement power follows the transfer of regulatory power to the EU level in cases where the set EU policy goals are expected not to be attained or have not been achieved due to the lack of uniform application of EU law (functional necessity).
12 It is true that the EU's competence in direct enforcement varies from having own strong direct powers (EEAs) to regulating national direct enforcement via norms and/or networks. Nevertheless, it is there and has been expanding following a certain logic -regulation at the EU level spurs the expansion of the EU's competence in direct enforcement to avoid potential challenges or to address proven imperfections in achieving EU policy goals. This shows two things. First, that the sequential character of the policy cycle provides the means to answer the what and where question: the next step in the policy cycle and the same policy area; a broadening and deepening seem to miss this clear sequential logic. Second, that the how 12 Despite the idea of spillover leading to ever more integration, we do not consider it an automated process; a lack of functional necessity, after all, implies no (further) spillover, neither along the policy cycle or otherwise.
This would be the case, for example, if enforcement by MS would be completely adequate so that no necessity for EU enforcement competences would arise. This point seems often forgotten in writings that stress the ongoing nature of integration.
question still remains somewhat illusive: what shape will the furthering along the policy cycle get (via EEAs or otherwise)? It would be interesting to investigate in this light whether exogenous pressures could explain the preference of one type of another. In all, the ability to predict next integration efforts more precisely may be considered an important addition for neofunctionalism as a theory of integration.
On a more critical note, this paper has merely shown that the policy cycle type of functional spillover exists.
It has yet to be investigated to what extent it also exists elsewhere (besides the establishment of EEAs we discussed). It is also recommended to research cases where the step towards enforcement did not happen even though functional necessity would require it. Nevertheless, even in the case of an absolute absence in other cases, we would argue that this only lessens the notion's importance but not its existence (the purpose of this paper). This also justifies our focus on EEAs in this paper -it is here where policy cycle type of functional spillover is most visible -, leaving the other two trends (and other potential cases) alone for now.
Then again, future quantitative research on the scope of EU's regulatory enforcement could also strengthen our argument. We have provided the original data on all EEAs and enforcement networks and agencies existing in the EU as of this writing. These entities exist in nearly all policy fields of the EU integration, from competition to transport and medicines. This institutionalization process seems to have followed (challenging) harmonization attempts to create a uniform application of EU law at the national level. For instance, EMA's predecessor was created because "the experience acquired as a result of Directive 87/22/EEC [harmonizing certain national measures] has shown that it is necessary to establish a centralized Community authorization procedure" (see Table 1 ). What is therefore important is a further analysis of the extent to which the EU regulates issues of national enforcement in all (exclusive/shared) competences via its norm setting. Such data could strengthen our argument of the existence of the policy cycle type of functional spillover and shed light on the scope of regulatory enforcement. In addition, future case studies in those areas where harmonization attempts succeed without subsequent institutionalization (creating a network or EEA) could contribute to policy makers and academics regarding the development of factors on when what type of EU involvement in direct enforcement could and should be necessary.
Conclusion
The expansion of competences from one step in the policy cycle to another (regulation --> enforcement), what we have dubbed the policy cycle type of functional spillover, is something that seems to have gone unnoticed in the works on functional spillover. While the increasing enforcement powers of the EU are occasionally mentioned, it is mostly in relation to a deepening of competences within one policy area, not in terms of a furthering of competences along the policy cycle. No distinction is made between the type of competences, i.e. between adding capacities within one policy cycle stage (regulation) and increasing competences in another stage (enforcement). In other words, it is not treated as a unique type of functional spillover that warrants its own investigation.
We conducted a literature study on functional spillover looking for references to enforcement and policy cycle spillover as part of the functional spillover concept (whether it is new) and seeking to identify criteria with which to assess when a development can be considered a spillover effect or not. Noting the lack of attention to policy cycle spillover in the functional spillover literature, we concluded that the concept as such is new. Regarding the criteria, we settled around the question:
does the expansion of competences along the policy-cycle occur thanks to the pressures from previous integration (functional necessity) or was it due to exogenous pressures (specific developments)?
After detailing the expansion of the EU's competence in direct enforcement along three developments, we investigated whether the proliferation of EEAs, the most far-reaching of the three developments in terms of allocation of direct enforcement powers at the EU level, is due to functional necessity or specific developments. Our analysis showed three types of cases. In at least five out of seven cases the policy cycle type of functional spillover could be noticed. We found that no EEA was created because of exogenous pressures only. This led us to conclude that we are indeed dealing with a new type of functional spillover.
Identifying the new type of functional spillover has a number of broader theoretical implications.
First, it brings the awareness that the policy cycle type of functional spillover deserves its own attention within the spillover literature. Second, the policy cycle logic provides a more concrete possibility for predicting next integration efforts. Spillover theory might predict ever more integration, but cannot really state what, where and how; the cycle aspect at least would enable the 'what' and 'where' question to be more precise: if implementation of regulation is failing, enforcement at the community level is likely to follow in the same policy area. The questions that warrants further investigation here is which type of enforcement (EEA, network or regulatory enforcement) would follow upon what conditions. Finally, we believe that our comprehensive discussion (via three developments) on the so far under studied EU's growing competence in direct enforcement gives new insights on the EU integration process, which invite a revisiting of intergovernmentalists-neofunctionalists debate on how EU integration has evolved and where it is heading.
